Abstract. In this paper, a formalization of the two-level mixed verication method of C-light programs, based on program specic transition systems, is suggested. Two kinds of such systems are used to formalize the method. The rst kind, operational semantics specic transition systems, is used to specify the C-light mixed operational semantics. The second kind, safety logic specic transition systems, is used to specify the mixed axiomatic semantics of C-kernel into which C-light programs are translated. The formalization makes this method more technological.
Introduction
The two-level approach is a trend in recent verication projects. This approach suggests translation of a source program into an intermediate language program and deductive verication of the obtained program.
CompCert [12] is a veried compiler for a large subset of C called Clight. Source programs are translated into Cminor language.
Why [10] is a software verication platform which contains an intermediate language of the same name, a general-purpose verication conditions generator, Krakatoa tool for verication of Java programs, and Frama-C tool for verication of C programs. The generator can be used with many existing provers (PVS, Z3, Coq, Isabelle/HOL, and others).
Dafny [11] is a programming language and a verier. It includes specication statements and can be considered as a modern version of Pascal or a safe version of C. Dafny programs are translated into the intermediate language Boogie [8] from which verication conditions are generated. At the proof stage, the SMT solver Z3 is used.
VCC [9] is an industrial-strength verication environment for a low-level concurrent system code written in C. VCC extends C with the design-bycontract features, like pre-and postconditions, as well as type invariants. Boogie is also used as an intermediate language for annotated C programs.
The Verisoft project [1] aims at the pervasive formal verication from the application level over the system level software down to the hardware. In this project, a subset of C called C0 is used. The Hoare logic environment is built on the top of Isabelle/HOL for a quite generic model of a sequential safety logic, one can prove safety properties of non-terminating programs, whereas axiomatic semantics assumes that the program, whose partial correctness is proven, terminates.
Fourthly, the mixed operational semantics rules and, respectively, Cprogram states are represented by a new formalism operational semantics specic transition systems (OS-STS) [4] .
Fifthly, an algorithm is suggested which allows us to check expression templates membership of three classes mentioned above. The feature of this algorithm is that the membership condition is formulated as a safety property and to check it the deductive inference based on SL-STS is used.
The states of C-light programs
The denition of an operational semantics of a programming language L with the help of OS-STS consists of two stages. At the rst stage, a oneto-one correspondence between L statements and expressions of OS-STS is dened. This correspondence species a kind of denotational semantics of L. The language of expressions which corresponds to L statements is called a projection of L on expressions and is denoted as L-exp. At the second stage, the OS-STS which species the operational semantics of L-exp is built. Then L semantics, which is called a denotational-operational semantics, is dened as a combination of L denotational semantics, which maps L programs to their projections, and L-exp operational semantics. In our case, we dene the C-light denotational-operational semantics. As the corresponding C-light statements are restored immediately from C-light-exp statements, we limit ourselves to a description of C-light-exp operational semantics only.
In this section, we describe the state of OS-STS, which species the Clight-exp operational semantics. According to the denition of such systems [4] , a state is an algebraic system of a special kind and is characterized by a set of predened and modiable signature symbols.
Let us dene symbols which specify memory models used in this semantics. There are two such memory models, common and simplied. The common memory model is used in the common rules and the simplied one is used in the special rules.
Let aa and bb stand for (value of a in s) and (value of b in s), respectively.
Let us dene symbols which describe the common memory model. The value v, returned by C-light-exp expressions, has the form (value a address b), where a is the returned value itself, b is its address. In the case when a C-light-exp expression is not an lvalue [18], b = undef. The predened symbols (value of _) and (address of _) are used to access the components a and b of the expression v and have the semantics (value (value of v) in s) = a and (value (address of v) in s) = b. The predened symbol (value _ address _) has the semantics (value (value a address b) in s) = (value aa address bb). The modiable logical symbol (_ is address) denes the property "to be an address". The expression ( The next group of symbols consists of the symbols parsing the expressions in compliance with their form. The modiable logical symbol (__ is address-independent) denes address-independent expressions. Usually this symbol is dened by a set of templates for address-independent expressions: (val (a is address-independent) s) = true if and only if the expression a satises even one of templates for address-independent expressions (is its instance). Thus the template x, where x is a simple variable, has the single instance, the variable x itself, and the instances of the template (a [ _ ] ), where a is a variable of array type, are the expressions of the element access to the array a. The modiable logical symbol (__ is partially address-independent) denes partially address-independent expressions. It is also dened by a set of templates. The modiable logical symbol (__ is address-dependent) denes address-dependent expressions. It is dened by two previous symbols as follows: (value (a is address-dependent) in s) = true if and only if (value of (a is address-independent) in s) = false and (value (a is partially address-independent) in s) = false.
The predened symbol (type of __) denes the expression type. The expression (type of a) returns the type of the expression a. The predened symbol (cast _ from __ to __) performs type casting. The expression (cast a from b to c) casts the expression aa of the type b to the type c.
The modiable symbols (__ is variable), and (__ is constant) dene program variables and constants, respectively.
Mixed operational semantics of C-light-exp
The complete set of C-light operational semantics rules, represented by labeled transition systems in Plotkin structural operational semantics style, can be found in [17] . The corresponding rules for C-light-exp, represented in the formalism of OS-STS, have the same structure, and can be obtained by simple rewriting. Therefore we represent only rules for those expressions of C-light-exp, which satisfy the classication of expressions dened in compliance with access to the values of these expressions (address-dependent, address-independent and partially address-independent).
The rules for access to a variable have the form:
(if a var a then (assume (* a is address-dependent)) (assume (* a is variable)) ((value) ::= (value (value of (address of a)) address (address of a)))) (if a var a then (assume (* a is partially address-independent)) (assume (* a is variable)) ((value) ::= (value (value of a) address (address of a)))) (if a var a then (assume (* a is address-independent)) (assume (* a is variable)) ((value) ::= (value (value of a) address undef)))
The rules for access to an array element have the form:
) is address-dependent)) b (w1 ::= (cast (value of (value)) from (* type of b) to int)) a (w2 ::= (address of (value))) ((value) ::= (value (value of (shift w2 by w1)) address (shift w2 by w1)))) The common rule for an address-dependent expression assignment has the form:
(if (a = b) var a b hvar w1 w2 w3 then (assume (* a is address-dependent)) b (w1 ::= (value)) a (w2 ::= (value)) (w3 ::= (cast (value of w1) from (* type of b) to (* type of a))) ((value of (address of w2)) ::= w3) ((value) ::= (value w3 address undef)))
The special rules for a variable assignment have the form:
(if (a = b) var a b hvar w then (assume (* a is partially address-independent)) (assume (* a is variable)) b (w ::= (cast (value of (value)) from (* type of b)
to (* type of a))) ((value of a) ::= w) ((value of (address of a)) ::= w) ((value) ::= (value w address undef))) (if (a = b) var a b hvar w then (assume (* a is address-independent)) (assume (* a is variable)) b (w ::= (cast (value of (value)) from (* type of b)
to (* type of a))) ((value of a) ::= w) ((value) ::= (value w address undef)))
The special rules for an array element assignment have the form:
(if ((a [ b ] ) = c) var a b c hvar w1 w2 w3 w4 then (assume (* (a [ b ] ) is address-independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) b (w2 ::= (value of (value))) a (w3 ::= (value of (value))) (w4 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a (a [ b ] ) is partially address-independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) b (w2 ::= (value of (value))) a (w3 ::= (value)) (w4 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a [ b ])))) (((value of w3) [ w2 ]) ::= w4) ((value of (shift (address of w3) by w2)) ::= w4) ((value) ::= (value w4 address undef)))
The special rules for a structure element assignment have the form:
(if ((a . b) = c) var a b c hvar w1 w2 w3 then (assume (* (a . b) is address-independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) a (w2 ::= (value of (value))) (w3 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a . b)))) ((w2 . b) ::= w3) ((value) ::= (value w3 address undef))) (if ((a . b) = c) var a b c hvar w1 w2 w3 then (assume (* (a . b) is partially address independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) a (w2 ::= (value)) (w3 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a . b)))) (((value of w2) . b) ::= w3) ((value of (shift (address of w2) to b)) ::= w3) ((value) ::= (value w3 address undef)))
In conclusion, we consider several common rules for expressions which do not satisfy the classication dened in compliance with access to the values of these expressions.
The rule for * operator has the form:
(if (* a) var a then a ((value) ::= (value (value of (value of (value))) address (value of (value)))))
The rule for & operator has the form:
(if (& a) var a then a ((value) ::= (value (address of (value)) address undef)))
The rule for constant computation has the form:
(if a var a then (assume (* a is constant)) ((value) ::= a))
4. Safety logic of C-kernel-exp OS-STS and SL-STS are dened in [4] so that their rules are almost identical for the same programming languages construct in many cases. C-kernel-exp safety logic rules considered here are almost identical to the corresponding C-light-exp mixed operational semantics rules except that assume* is used instead of assume.
(if a var a then (assume* (* a is address-dependent)) (assume* (* a is variable)) ((value) ::= (value (value of (address of a)) address (address of a)))) (if a var a then (assume* (* a is partially address-independent)) (assume* (* a is variable)) ((value) ::= (value (value of a) address (address of a)))) (if a var a then (assume* (* a is address-independent)) (assume* (* a is variable)) ((value) ::= (value (value of a) address undef)))
The rules for access to an array element have the form: ) is address-independent)) b (w1 ::= (cast (value of (value)) from (* type of b) to int)) a (w2 ::= (value of (value))) ((value) ::= (value (w2 [ w1 ]) address undef)))
The rules for access to a structure element have the form:
(if (a . b) var a b hvar w then (assume* (* (a . b) is address-dependent)) a (w ::= (address of (value))) ((value) ::= (value (value of (shift w to b)) address (shift w to b)))) The common rule for an address-dependent expression assignment has the form:
(if (a = b) var a b hvar w1 w2 w3 then (assume* (* a is address-dependent)) b (w1 ::= (value)) a (w2 ::= (value)) (w3 ::= (cast (value of w1) from (* type of b) to (* type of a))) ((value of (address of w2)) ::= w3) ((value) ::= (value w3 address undef)))
(if (a = b) var a b hvar w then (assume* (* a is partially address-independent)) (assume* (* a is variable)) b (w ::= (cast (value of (value)) from (* type of b)
to (* type of a))) ((value of a) ::= w) ((value of (address of a)) ::= w) ((value) ::= (value w address undef))) (if (a = b) var a b hvar w then (assume* (* a is address-independent)) (assume* (* a is variable)) b (w ::= (cast (value of (value)) from (* type of b)
(if ((a [ b ] ) = c) var a b c hvar w1 w2 w3 w4 then (assume* (* (a [ b ] ) is address-independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) b (w2 ::= (value of (value))) a (w3 ::= (value of (value))) (w4 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a [ b ])))) ((w3 [ w2 ]) ::= w4) ((value) ::= (value w4 address undef))) (if ((a [ b ] ) = c) var a b c hvar w1 w2 w3 w4 then (assume* (* (a [ b ] ) is partially address-independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) b (w2 ::= (value of (value))) a (w3 ::= (value)) (w4 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a [ b ])))) (((value of w3) [ w2 ]) ::= w4) ((value of (shift (address of w3) by w2)) ::= w4) ((value) ::= (value w4 address undef)))
(if ((a . b) = c) var a b c hvar w1 w2 w3 then (assume* (* (a . b) is address-independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) a (w2 ::= (value of (value))) (w3 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a . b)))) ((w2 . b) ::= w3) ((value) ::= (value w3 address undef))) (if ((a . b) = c) var a b c hvar w1 w2 w3 then (assume* (* (a . b) is partially address independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) a (w2 ::= (value)) (w3 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a . b)))) (((value of w2) . b) ::= w3) ((value of (shift (address of w2) to b)) ::= w3) ((value) ::= (value w3 address undef)))
The rule for constant computation has the form: In introduction, we gave an informal denition of partially address-independent and address-independent expressions, and in subsequent sections we used predened logical symbols (__ is partially address-independent) and (__ is address-independent) for the description of all expression kinds assuming that they dene the corresponding kinds of expressions correctly (for a concrete program). In this section, we dene them formally on the basis of an OS-STS of a special form which simultaneously executes Clight-exp expressions for two memory models, common and simplied. This OS-STS is dened in such a manner that if a program p is safe with respect to a precondition q, then the symbols (__ is partially address-independent) and (__ is address-independent) dene the corresponding expression kinds correctly for the program p, started in the state when q is true. This OS-STS is obtained from the OS-STS describing the C-light-exp mixed operational semantics in the following way.
Firstly, for all rules of access to the value of a partially address-independent expression, the continuation condition assert is inserted which checks the coincidence of these expressions values in two memory models. The collection of such conditions denes the safety property which should be satised with partially address-independent expressions. Secondly, for each rule which uses the address access (for reading or writing), the continuation condition assert is inserted which checks whether this address exists. The collection of such conditions denes the safety property which should be satised with address-independent expressions, as no address exists for such variables.
(if a var a then (assume (* a is address-dependent)) (assume (* a is variable)) ((value) ::= (value (value of (address of a)) address (address of a)))) (if a var a then (assume (* a is partially address-independent)) (assume (* a is variable)) (assert ((value of a) = (value of (address of a)))) ((value) ::= (value (value of a) address (address of a)))) (if a var a then (assume (* a is address-independent)) (assume (* a is variable)) ((value) ::= (value (value of a) address undef)))
(if (a [ b ] ) var a b hvar w1 w2 then (assume (* (a [ b ] ) is address-dependent)) b (w1 ::= (cast (value of (value)) from (* type of b) to int)) a (w2 ::= (address of (value))) ((value) ::= (value (value of (shift w2 by w1)) address (shift w2 by w1)))) (if ( The common rule for an address-dependent expression assignment has the form:
(if (a = b) var a b hvar w1 w2 w3 then (assume (* (a . b) is address-independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) a (w2 ::= (value of (value))) (w3 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a . b)))) ((w2 . b) ::= w3) ((value) ::= (value w3 address undef))) (if ((a . b) = c) var a b c hvar w1 w2 w3 then (assume (* (a . b) is partially address independent)) c (w1 ::= (value of (value))) a (w2 ::= (value)) (w3 ::= (cast w1 from (* type of c) to (* type of (a . b)))) (((value of w2) . b) ::= w3) (assert ((shift (address of w2) to b) is address)) ((value of (shift (address of w2) to b)) ::= w3) ((value) ::= (value w3 address undef)))
(if (* a) var a then a (assert ((address of (value)) is address)) ((value) ::= (value (value of (value of (value))) address (value of (value)))))
(if (& a) var a then a (assert ((address of (value)) is address)) ((value) ::= (value (address of (value)) address undef)))
6. The algorithm of search for partially address-independent and address-independent expressions
In [7] the algorithm of static analysis was suggested to nd address-independent variables (non-shared variables). In this section we describe the method of proving that the logical symbols (__ is partially address-independent) and (__ is address-independent) dene the corresponding expression kinds correctly (for a concrete program). Then the algorithm of search for partially address-independent and address-independent expressions is reduced to enumeration of dierent possibilities of these logical symbols interpretations and to nding the correct interpretation. The proof method is based on safety properties check described in the previous section. This check is built in the rules of SL-STS. This system consists of OS-STS rules represented in the previous section, where assume is replaced by assume*, and of the modied rules for expressions which require invariants (for loops and goto statements), and functions calls.
(if a var a then (assume* (* a is address-dependent)) (assume* (* a is variable)) ((value) ::= (value (value of (address of a))
In this case the invariant i is not a formula but the algorithm of checking partial address independence and address independence. This invariant has the form (prove a), where a is a sequence of expressions of two kinds (b is partially address-independent) or (b is address-independent), b is a C-kernel-exp expression. The algorithm of checking is dened by the following safety logic rules:
(if (prove ((a is partially address-independent) b)) var a (seq b) then (assume* (* a is variable)) (assert ((value of a) = (value of (address of a)))) (prove b)) (if (prove (((a [ b ] ) is partially address-independent) c)) var a b (seq c) hvar w1 w2 then b (w1 ::= (cast (value of (value)) from (* type of b) to int)) a (w2 ::= (value)) (assert (((value of w2) [ w1 ]) = (value of (shift (address of w2) by w1)))) (prove c)) (((a . b) is partially address-independent) c)) var a b (seq c) hvar w then a (w2 ::= (value)) (assert (((value of w) . b) = (value of (shift (address of w) to b)))) (prove c)) (if (prove ((a is address-independent) b)) var a (seq b) then a (assert ((address of (value)) = undef)) (prove b)) (if (prove) then emptyseq)
The invariant (prove a) is constructed for a concrete program point p in the following way. In the sequence a we add all expressions b of the program p, which are dened in this point and which are either addressindependent expressions (in this case the addition item has the form (b is address-independent)) or partially address-independent expressions (in this case the addition item a has the form (b is partially addressindependent)).
The invariants of other loops and goto statements are dened similarly. The semantics of function calls is dened so that the function precondition and postcondition coincide and they represent an invariant of the same form as for loops, i. e. function computation has to keep this invariant.
The application domain of the algorithm of search for partially addressindependent and address-independent expressions is limited to programs whose invariants do not contain side-eects expressions. 7. Conclusion In this work the following new results on the two-level mixed verication method of C-light programs were obtained:
1. Three classes of expressions depending on the kind of access to address were extracted: address-independent, partially address-independent and address-dependent. 2. The rules of the C-kernel mixed axiomatic semantics are replaced by the safety logic rules based on safety logic specic transition systems [4] , that allowed us to extend the class of proved properties. 3. The rules of C-light mixed operational semantics and, respectively, Clight program states are represented by a new formalism, operational semantics specic transition systems [4] . 4. A new kind of a programing language semantics, denotational-operational semantics, was dened. 5. The algorithm of search for partially address-independent and addressindependent expressions based on safety logic specic transition systems was suggested. We plan to integrate the C-kernel safety logic rules into a multi-language system of program analysis and verication SPECTRUM [2, 14] based on the domain-specic language Atoment [3, 5] intended to develop program verication methods and tools.
